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Tax Sheltered Securities: Is There a
Broker-Dealer in the Woodwork?
By CHARLES W. MURDOCK*
Recent developments relating to the question of "what is a
security" have produced a great deal of discussion with respect
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
In Volume 25, Issue 2 of the Hastings Law Journal, Messrs.
Hannan and Thomas presented an analytic framework for
determining the existence or nonexistence of a "security."
Charles W. Murdock extends this discussion by pointing out
that the vendors of many nonconventional securities may
need to be registered as broker-dealers under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The author focuses on those eco-
nomic interests which are sold primarly as tax shelters, and
discusses the applicability of the broker-dealer registration
requirements in light of the policy of the 1934 Act.
THOSE interested in legal curiosities have no doubt been intrigued
by recent developments relating to the question of "what is a secur-
ity." The sale of condominiums (under appropriate circumstances)
can involve the sale of a security;1 in a similar vein, the sale of lei-
* B.S.Ch.E., 1956, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D., 1963, Loyola Uni-
versity. Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; Visiting Professor, University
of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347, January 4, 1973, [1972-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79-163, the Commission announced that the of-
fering of condominium units in conjunction with any one of the following will cause
the offering to be viewed as an offering of securities in the form of investment con-
tracts:
"1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other similar service, are of-
fered and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the purchaser to be de-
rived from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement; and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the purchaser must hold
[5181
sure oriented raw land may also. 2 Even the sale of Scotch whiskey can
give rise to a security.8 In addition, interests in orange groves, 4 cat-
tle breeding and feeding arrangements, 5 beaver ranching,6 franchises,
7
his unit available for rental for any part of the year, must use an exclusive rental
agent or is otherwise materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his unit."
In SEC v. Marasol Properties, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,159
(D.D.C. 1973), the court granted a permanent injunction forbidding the sale of con-
dominium units for the primary purpose of investment rather than occupancy by the
purchasers when coupled with an undertaking to arrange continuing rental of the units
for the benefit of the purchasers unless the same were registered under the 1933 Act,
and it further enjoined selling activity by the defendants unless registered as broker-
dealers under the 1934 Act. In a somewhat related vein, see 1050 Tenants Corp. v.
Jakobson, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,177 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
where the court held that shares in a cooperative were not only securities on their
face but that the total transaction also constituted an investment contract. In addition
to owner occupied apartments, there was also space available for professional offices
and substantial sponsor control of the project existed.
2. See McCubbrey v. Boise Cascade, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FD.
SEc. L. RnP. 1 93,414 (N.D. Cal. 1972), for a summary of a complaint in which it
was alleged that investments in California recreational community developments consti-
tuted a security in that the plaintiffs were investing in a common scheme from which
they could expect profits without efforts on their part and through the efforts of others.
According to the summary, the investors were to provide the money and the defendant
corporations were to provide financing, management, development of common areas
and community facilities.
In addition, the land purchase contract of the prospective buyer, when sold by
the promoter to other investors, may constitute a security. See SEC v. Lake Havasu
Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
See also SEC v. Federal Shopping Way, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fmn. SEC. L. REP. 92,825 (9th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corp.,
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RPp. 91,982 (C.D. Cal. 1967); and
SEC v. Great Western Land & Development, Inc., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH
FaD. SEc. L. REP. f 91,537 (D. Ariz. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 918
(9th Cir. 1966).
3. In 1969, the Commission promulgated Securities Act Release No. 5018,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,757, which maintained that
the sale of scotch whiskey warehouse receipts might involve the sale of a security. The
position of the SEC was recently adopted in SEC v. M.A. Lundy Associates, [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,040 (D.R.I. 1973). See Pennfield Co.
of Cal. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F.
Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942).
4. One of the most frequently cited Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
question of what is a security, SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), involved
the sale of orange groves, coupled with service contracts to cultivate and manage the
groves. The sale of orange groves to unsophisticated investors through high pressure
selling tactics in situations where such an investment was wholly inappropriate for the
investor was the subject of a recent and well publicized Commission investigatory pro-
ceeding. See American Agronomics Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5667 (Dec.
11, 1972).
5. See American Dairy Leasing Corp., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. No-Action Letter
(Dec. 3, 1971), [1971-19-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. Sac. L. RP. 78,584. See
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pyramid sales arrangements8 and many other interests that the general
practitioner might not recognize as "securities" have been held to be
securities.
Many, though not all, of these nonconventional securities involve
what is known as a tax shelter9 and because this characteristic adds
also Stratford of Texas, Inc., SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. No-Action Letter (Oct. 6, 1972),
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,099.
6. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968).
7. In a very well reasoned opinion, the Attorney General of California took the
position that, under certain circumstances, the sale of a franchise could involve the
sale of a security. 49 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 124 (1967). His reasoning, however,
failed to persuade one court. See Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). Legislation in some
jurisdictions has given separate protection for franchise investors. See Franchise In-
vestment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp. 1973); Franchise Invest-
ment Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 19.100.010-19.100.940 (1972
Supp.).
8. The courts are looking less favorably upon a cousin of the franchise, the
pyramid sales arrangement. These arrangements involve "a sales pitch which stresses
the amount of money a participant can make on the recruitment of others to participate
in the plan" according to the SEC. Applicability of the Securities Laws to Multi-level
Distributorships and Pyramid Sales Plans, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5211, Nov.
30, 1971 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,446 at 80,974; see
SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii
1971). In the Glen Turner case, the court of appeals held that the expectation of
profit need not come "solely" from the efforts of others but rather that the word
"solely" must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition of secur-
ity those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities. Such reasoning
could tend to undermine the River City Steak case, 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970),
ajf'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
9. Tax shelters are business ventures that are so structured that "tax deductions
produced by the business will flow directly to the investors who can use these deduc-
tions in offsetting taxable income from other sources." DROLLINGER, TAx SHELTERS
AND TAX FREE INCOME FOR EVERYONE 1 (1972) (hereinafter cited as DROLLINGER].
Another author has discussed the nature of tax shelters as follows: "One of the in-
centives for an investor in such diverse areas as subsidized housing, oil and gas drilling,
cattle feeding and breeding, agriculture and equipment leasing, is the tax benefits af-
forded thereby. Such benefits range from the simple deferment from one year to the
next of payment of ordinary income taxes (as in a single cattle feeding program) to
the relatively 'deep' shelter advantages involved in an oil and gas drilling program
which finds vast oil reserves, permitting dramatic long-term capital appreciation on soft
dollars as well as continuous annual tax-free cash payouts to the investor. 'Shelter'
from tax is intended herein to cover this full range of tax benefits. 'Shelter' has also
been used to refer narrowly to the effect of depreciation deductions in 'sheltering' from
tax the cash flow from operations until the 'cross-over' point. We shall treat 'shelter'
in this sense as well." R. HAFT, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS Intro. 1 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as HAFT].
Every tax shelter does not involve a security. As a simple example, if a doctor
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another dimension to the sale of securities, this article will concern it-
self primarily with the sale of such securities.
The focus of discussion with respect to these nonconventional se-
curities has been primarily on the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act): 0
If the sale of a security involves the use of interstate facilities, the secur-
ities must be registered unless the securities are exempt or the trans-
action is exempt from registration.1 A prima facie case under sec-
tion 12(1) of the 1933 Act'2 is established simply by showing that (1)
a security has been sold, (2) interstate facilities were involved, and
(3) the securities were not registered.' 3 The appropriate remedy is
recission or its equivalent.14  Thus, an after-the-fact, or more precisely
"after-the-sale," determination that a particular interest is a security
has rather untoward consequences. In effect, the buyer is given a "put"
if he acts within the one year statute of limitations. 5
In one publicized incident, the seller of investment condomini-
ums in Hawaii was required to make an offer of rescission to 152 pur-
chasers, to refund over $200,000 and to resell forty-eight previously
sold units.' 6
in a high tax bracket were to purchase improved real estate and if he had ultimate
managerial authority with respect to such real estate, no security would be involved.
However, as Mr. Haft has stated: "A security is involved when an investor provides
capital and shares in the risks and the profits, and the promotor or a third party man-
ages, operates, and controls, the enterprise, usually without active participation on the
part of the investor." Id. § 2.02. See also note 39 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, for example, How TO REGISTER AND MARKET CONDOMINIUM OFFERINGS
(Schwartz, ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz], a publication produced by the
New York Law Journal in connection with a continuing legal education program.
11. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), sets forth
the general mandate that securities must be registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission prior to sales utilizing jurisdictional means; section 3 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77c (1970), enumerates those securities which are generally exempt from the
1933 Act; and section 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970), sets forth those
transactions to which section 5 of the 1933 Act shall not apply.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(1) (1970).
13. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
14. Section 12(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(l) (1970), provides that
anyone who sells a security in violation of section 5 "shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security.
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
15. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), provides, in effect, that
no action shall be maintained under section 12(1) unless brought within one year after
the violation upon which it is based. There is a further overriding limitation that no
action under section 12(1) shall be brought more than three years after the security
was bona fide offered to the public.
16. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 27.
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Impact of the 1934 Act
Once an economic interest is deemed to be a security, problems
arise not only with respect to registration of the security under the
1933 Act but also with respect to the multi-faceted provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)." While certain provi-
sions of that act, such as the registration requirements of section 12,1s
will generally not be applicable in connection with the sale of tax
sheltered securities, other provisions of the act not only will be appli-
cable but will have some very unpleasant consequences, at least when
seen through the eyes of the members of the tax shelter industry. 9
Thus, vendors of tax sheltered securities may well need to be regis-
tered pursuant to section 1520 of the 1934 Act and subject to the re-
porting requirements of section 17;21 moreover, the extension of credit
on such securities may well be subject to the strictures of sections
7 and 11(d)(1)22 of the act. In addition, if interstate instrumen-
talities are used in connection with the sale, the antifraud provisions
of section 10 and Rule 10b-5 may come into play. 23 The scope of
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (1970).
18. Section 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), generally provides that
it is unlawful for a member of an exchange or a broker or a dealer to effect a securities
transaction on a national securities exchange unless the security is registered on such ex-
change. Section 12 also provides that with respect to a security which is not registered
on an exchange, an issuer with total assets exceeding one million dollars and a class of
equity security held of record by 500 or more persons shall register such security with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
19. See Resort Condominiums: History, Securities Aspects, Registration Require-
ments (pts. 1-3), New York Law Journal, February 21, 22 & 23, 1973, reprinted in
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 23-40. The authors state: "Proceedings of the conference
workshop indicate the extreme concern of the part of the development industry about
governmental regulation and registration requirements for condominium developments
which offer a rental arrangement ....
[T]he time, cost and problems attendant to condominium registration with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission alone were considered by most participants at the
conference as extremely burdensome on a condominium development. The licensing
requirements of broker-dealers for sale of the investment contract package were also
considered very detrimental to developers of condominium projects. Finally, the re-
strictions placed on advertising by the Securities Act of 1933 because of the investment
contract aspects of rental condominium offerings were viewed as unreasonable re-
straints upon the marketing and promotion of what is predominately a real estate in-
terest." Schwartz, supra, at 33.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78g, k(d)(1) (1970); see HAFT, supra note 9, at § 2.05[2];
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 443.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970); 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1973). For background on
Rule 10b-5, see Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972
DuE L.J. 1125.
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this article will be limited to a consideration of the impact of sec-
tion 15 once a particular economic interest is classified as a security.
The Scope of Section 15
Section 15 requires the registration of any broker or dealer sell-
ing any security, with certain specified exceptions, assuming, as will
almost invariably be the case, that the broker or dealer uses interstate
instrumentalities to effect or induce the sale.
24
The first exception relates to the conduct of a business which is
"exclusively intrastate." In many circumstances involving the sale of
tax sheltered securities, this exemption clearly will not be available.
In addition to the fact that the exemption is construed very narrowly,2
5
the sale of tax shelters often involves an issuer located in one state
selling to an investor located in another. For example, in the sale of
investment condominiums, the condominium is normally located in a
recreational area (e.g., Hawaii, Lake Tahoe, Colorado Springs),
whereas the investor is located in a major metropolitan area.. If the
condominium were located close at hand, the investor probably would
not need to enter into a rental pooling arrangement which is the
factor converting the condominium from a mere real estate invest-
ment into a security.' 6 Since the policy underlying the intrastate ex-
emption for brokers or dealers is analogous to that underlying the in-
trastate exemption with regard to the registration of securities-local
financing of local businesses by local citizens is not within the purview
of federal regulation-any interstate activity by the broker or dealer
will destroy his exemption.27
24. As the Commission's staff has stated, "the type of conduct deemed to involve
the use of jurisdictional means are quite broad. Thus, for example, the use of the
mails at any stage of a securities transaction to transmit a purchase agreement [Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1968)] or a confirmation [U.S. v. Wolf-
son, 405 F.2d 779, 784 (2nd Cir. 1968)] would be sufficient and, specifically for pur-
poses of section 15 of the Act, the use of the mails, a telephone or other facilities
of interstate commerce at any integral step in the course of inducing the purchase or
sale of a security would involve the utilization of the jurisdiction means [Roe v. U.S.,
316 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1963)]." Hoare & Co. v. Govett, Ltd., SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. No-
Action Letter (Sept. 28, 1973).
25. As Mr. Haft has stated, "Mhis exemption is as illusory as the intrastate
exemption under the 1933 Act . . . . Mhe administrative interpretations of this
exemption have effectively eliminated the exemption in most instances." HAFr, supra
note 9, § 2.05[l], at 2-22 to -23.
26. See note 1 supra.
27. As Ezra Weiss has stated: "Manifestly, the 'exclusively intrastate' business
exemption is based on the local and limited character of the broker's or dealer's busi-
ness. The term 'exclusively' is therefore given its literal meaning." E. WEiss, REGIs-
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The second exemption relates to the sale of an "exempted security"
or commercial paper. Section 3(a)(12)28 of the Act enumerates var-
ious securities which are classified as "exempt" and goes on to author-
ize the Securities and Exchange Commission (the commission), 29 to ex-
empt other securities "either unconditionally or upon specified terms
and conditions or for stated periods" from the operation of any one or
more sections of the statute which do not, by their terms, apply to ex-
empted securities. Since section 15 provides for such exemption, it
would be possible for the commission to treat tax sheltered securities
as exempt securities for purposes of section 15 and thereby to elimi-
nate the need for registration of those who limit their broker
or dealer activity to such securities. To date, however, the commis-
sion has not so acted.
30
The last exemption deals with securities which are traded on a na-
tional securities exchange. With the exception of real estate invest-
ment trusts, there is little after market activity in tax sheltered securi-
ties and accordingly this exemption is of little significance in the pres-
ent context. 1
In addition to the exceptions set forth in section 15(a)(1) of
the Act, section 15(b) (2) permits the commission, by rule, reg-
TRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS § 2-4, at 15 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as WEISS]. With respect to the example at hand, Mr. Weiss has said: "The
business of a broker or dealer is not exclusively intrastate if he is a participant in
the distribution of securities of an out-of-state issuer, or even if he acts only as a
broker in the sale of an out-of-state block of securities from an out-of-state issuer to
a local customer." Id. at 14. See note 25 supra.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
29. The Securities and Exchange Commission was created pursuant to section 4
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1970).
30. An example of exemptive action by the Commission is found in SEC Rule
3a-12-1, 17 CFR § 240.3a-12-1 (1973), in which mortgages, as defined in section 302
(d) of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq., which
have been sold by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation are exempted from
the operation of such provisions of the Act which by their terms do not apply to ex-
empted securities.
Because of the extension of credit problems created by sections 7 and 11(d)(1)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, k(d)(1) (1970), the Commission may in the future
exempt tax sheltered securities. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 443. This would also
have the effect of exempting brokers who limit their business solely to the distribution
of tax sheltered securities from registration pursuant to section 15 and thereby remove
them from the coverage of the Securities Investors Protection Act. Whether that Act
ought to apply to vendors of tax sheltered securities is debatable.
31. See SEC, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 9-11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as the Dickey Report].
Copies of this report are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Document 723-95731).
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ulation or order, to exempt a particular broker or dealer, or a class
of brokers or dealers, from the registration requirements of section
15(a) (1) "either unconditionally or upon specified terms and condi-
tions or for specified periods." But, once again, the commission has
not taken any action with regard to the sale of tax sheltered securities
The Policy Considerations
With the foregoing perspective in mind, the question of the distri-
bution of tax sheltered securities can now be considered from a policy
standpoint. This requires an analysis of the role played by the vari-
ous intermediaries in the course of the investor ultimately acquiring
a tax sheltered security, and an examination of the policy reasons un-
derlying the registration process, in order to determine who ought
to be registered as a broker-dealer and whether the commission should
exercise its exemptive power, either conditionally or unconditionally.
The first step, of course, must be an examination of the legislative
purpose in providing for registration of brokers and dealers.
The Purpose of Registration
The statutory and regulatory scheme with respect to the registra-
tion of brokers and dealers is aimed at insuring their character, com-
petence and financial stability. In the 1963 Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 it was
stated:
More than a generation of experience with the Federal securities
laws has demonstrated, moreover, that it is impossible to reg-
ulate effectively the conduct of those in the securities industry,
unless would be members are adequately screened to the point
of entry . . . . The right to carry on those functions of the in-
dustry which involve the public investor should be available only
to those who shall have demonstrated their ability to meet at least
minimal standards of integrity, competence, and financial re-
sponsibility.33
In his transmittal letter to Congress, enclosing the first part of the
Special Study, Chairman Cary, in discussing the weaknesses brought to
light by the Special Study, stated:
The report begins where regulations must begin-the point of en-
try into the business. It is self-evident that the standards of con-
duct of the securities industry are vitally dependent on the integ-
rity and competency of its personnel. Obviously, no system can be
32. H.R. Doe. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Special Study].
33. Id. pt. 1, at 150.
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devised which eliminates all potential wrongdoers. But the Re-
port of the Special Study concludes that the minimal controls fur-
nished by existing regulations are inadequate. Notable ease of
entry is apparent under both Federal law and rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the self-regulatory agency
for the over-the-counter market. With the exception of the ma-
jor exchanges, significant standards of character, competence, and
minimal capital have not been generally imposed . . . . Fur-
thermore, certain sectors of the industry, including most impor-
tantly certain distributors of mutual fund and real estate securities
and also investment advisors, are not subject to the discipline of
self-regulation.3
4
The response of Congress was the extensive amendments adopted
in 1964.31 While the 1964 amendments also dealt extensively with
the regulation of securities traded in the over-the-counter market, both
the Senate and the House Reports accompanying the respective bills
recognized that the quality of selling practices was a co-equal con-
cern. The Senate Report stated that one of the two principle pur-
poses was to "strengthen the standards of entrance into the securities
business, enlarge the scope of self-regulation, and strengthen Commis-
disciplinary controls over brokers, dealers, and their employees,"3 6
while the House Report stated that one of the two major purposes was
to "strengthen qualification standards and disciplinary controls with
respect to securities industry personnel, particularly those engaged in
the over-the-counter market.
'3 7
It is thus clear that an essential thrust of the securities laws is to
insure that the investing public deals with qualified personnel in the
course of making and consummating an investment decision.
Policy Considerations in the Sale of Tax Sheltered Securities
The question may then be raised as to whether these concerns are
of any less import in connection with the sale of tax sheltered securi-
ties or, conversely, whether the general policy of insuring that the
sales effort in connection with the sale of securities is conducted by
persons of high integrity and competence is all the more important
when dealing with the subject of tax sheltered securities. A consider-
34. Id. pt. 1, at v.
35. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-467, 78 Stat. 565. The preamble to the Act states that its purposes are "to extend
disclosure requirements to the issuers of additional publicly traded securities, to provide
for improved qualification and disciplinary procedures for registered brokers and
dealers, and for other purposes."
36. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
37. H.R. REP. No. 14187 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
THE HASTINGS LAW JIOURNAL [Vol. 25
ation of the nature of tax sheltered securities indicates that the latter
consideration is the operable one.
The Nature of a Tax Sheltered Security
The term "tax shelter" encompasses a broad spectrum of which
tax sheltered securities comprise only a part. 8 Encompassed within
the ambit of tax sheltered securities are a wide variety of economic in-
terests ranging from real estate investments (both subsidized and un-
subsidized), oil and gas programs, equipment leasing programs,
"farming" activity (including both livestock and crops) and even
more exotic activities among which are investments in movies, plays
and Scotch whiskey.39
In discussing tax sheltered securities, each commentator invari-
ably is constrained to point out that such securities typically involve a
higher degree of risk than other types of investments. 40  Failure to
appreciate the nature of tax sheltering may cause investors to "learn
to their sorrow that what is represented to them to be a tax shelter may
in fact be a tax trap. ' 41 It has been stated: "Effective tax sheltering re-
quires matching the tax characteristics of the investors with the tax
characteristics of the investment. Both sets of characteristics are com-
plex, and they interrelate in complicated and sometimes surprising
ways."
'42
The Special Study itself recognized that in the late 50's there was a
significant change toward more speculative ventures in the nature of
38. See note 9 supra.
39. Extensive discussion of each of these forms of tax shelter is found in DROL-
LINGER, supra note 9 and HAFr, supra note 9. See also How To UsE TAX SHELTERS
TODAY (I. Schreiber, ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Schreiber].
40. One attorney who has viewed tax sheltered investments from the vantage
point of attorney for the syndicator, as well aS attorney for the investor and as an
investor himself, has stated: "A lot of people buy tax shelter who have no business
doing so. Tax sheltered investments, by and large, have a significantly higher degree
of risk than ordinary investments. One has to be able to benefit substantially from
the tax benefits to offset the risk. Therefore, I would not recommend a tax sheltered
investment (other than a REIT) to anyone in less than a 50% income bracket."
Pircher, Tax Sheltered Investments: What, Who, When and Which? 28 Bus. LAw.
897, 913 (1973). Another commentaor has stated: "Any person who seeks to invest
in a tax shelter deal solely for the tax benefits is bound to lose. Obviously, the
greater the tax shelter, the less the need for underlying investment value, but the trans-
action must in all events make substantial business and economic sense. Even an in-
vestment in federally subsidized housing with its extremely advantageous tax benefits
will turn into an absolute nightmare if the project does not make sound real estate
sense." HAPT, supra note 9, at Intro-3. See text accompanying notes 41 & 42 infra.
41. Calkins & Updegraft, Jr., Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAw. 493 (1972-1973).
42. Id. at 493-94.
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the tax shelters being sold to the public, at least in the area of real
estate syndication:
Securities offered to the public in early years of syndication largely
represented ownership of office buildings and apartment build-
ings. As the success of the early ventures generated more and
more competition for properties available for syndication, syn-
dicators turned from office buildings and residential properties to
commercial and industrial properties, to hotels, motels, bowling
alleys, shopping centers and to properties not already con-
structed.
43
This trend has continued in the late 1960's and early 1970's and now
encompasses the development of recreational areas and resort prop-
erties. 4   The Special Study recognized that in these situations the in-
vestor's risks are substantially increased as contrasted to the security
afforded when the investment consists of prime commercial or residen-
tial property, particularly when secured by long term leases from
triple A tenants.
45
The risks of tax sheltered securities are extenuated by the fact
43. Special Study, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 577.
44. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 26-27. The fine tuning necessary in connection
with the sale of tax sheltered securities is well illustrated by one of the more recent
phenomena, investment condominiums. Developers of resort properties have hit
upon the concept of condominiums as a mechanism for financing the development of
properties that otherwise might not be economically feasible to develop. The resort
property is constructed with the intention of selling the units to a large number of
investors, each of whom will procure his own financing and bear the economic risk
of the enterprise, thereby permitting the promoter to walk away with the construction
profit, free of any long term liability and yet to retain an essentially riskless interest
in the enterprise through a management contract with the individual investors associ-
ated together.
Looking at the transaction from the vantage point of the investor, the purchase
of the condominium is one which is normally not justified on the basis of individual
use; nor would it be justified on the basis of the potential economical return flowing
from participation in a rental pooling agreement covering the period when the investor
is not making personal use of his property; nor is the "tax shelter" alone sufficient
to justify the investment. It requires the coalescence of these three factors to produce
the justification for the investment. If any of these factors, all of which are high risk,
fail to materalize, the investor will be disenchanted, to say nothing of his out of
pocket loss. For example, see the discussion in SEC Registration No. 2-46702, Resort
One, at 3-5. See also Schreiber, supra note 39, at 104-05.
In KAIC-I, SEC Registration No. 2-48126 at 24, it is pointed out that at 15% occu-
pancy the investor would lose approximately $1,500 but with 30% occupancy the in-
vestor would obtain an after tax net cash flow at a break even point. However, if
there is a determination by the IRS that the ownership and operation of the unit is not
actively engaged in for profit, tax benefits are lost, the after tax net cash deficit at a
15% occupancy rate would be almost $3,000 and at a 30% occupancy rate would now
be a deficit of almost $1,400.
45. See Special Study, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 586.
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that there is little after-market activity in such securities. This
is in part due to the fact that the value of the security is a function
of the shelter provided which, in turn, is constantly changing over
time.4 6 Moreover, the rate of depreciation itself may change when
the "security" changes hands, losing its character as new construction
and thereby being subject to the more restrictive rules dealing with
used properties.47  The Special Study also recognized this problem as
one pointing toward the need for increased investor protection:
While limited partnership interests are generally transferable (usu-
ally subject to the consent of the general partners), as a rule there
is no market for such interests after their original distribution. An
investor who wishes to dispose of a limited partnership interest oc-
casionally may do so through the original syndicator or under-
writer, who will act as his agent in placing the interest for a brok-
erage commission, but there is no general over-the-counter trad-
ing in such interests. Indeed, the tax complexities involved in
such interests make valuation for trading purposes highly difficult,
since the extent of the 'tax shelter' constantly changes with amor-
tization payments and depreciation deductions.
48
More recently, the 1972 Report of the Real Estate Advisory Com-
mittee49 summarized the risks involved in the sale of real estate tax
sheltered securities as follows:
An analysis of the risks inherent in the real estate limited part-
nership security, therefore, must take into account the lack of
liquidity and necessarily long term investment which it affords.
Some other risks inherent in this type of security include: pos-
46. See Calkins & Updegraft, Jr., Tax Shelters, 26 TAX LAw. 493, 507-08 (1972-
1973). The authors state: "A basic rule is that an investor should never invest in
a long-term leverage shelter without insisting on reviewing the arithmetic through the
entire term of the investment, showing the consequences if the property should be sold,
or the nonrecourse obligation foreclosed, at various dates. Normally, this arithmetic
will show a substantial tax liability arising in a future year. This liability, discounted
to present value, must be considered in evaluating the economic merits of the proposed
investment. Sophisticated shelter proposals will indicate the amount of funds the in-
vestor should set aside in what we call a payback sinking fund, for instance in tax
exempts, so as to have the cash with which to pay the taxes due in the future." Id.
at 508.
47. 'See HAFr, supra note 9, at § 1.06[5]: "[A] 'sale or exchange' of fifty per-
cent or more of the total interest in the partnership capital and profits within a period
of twelve consecutive months will cause a termination of a partnership for federal tax
purposes. In such event, a partnership's right as 'first user' to avail itself of the double
declining balance method for computing' its allowance for depreciation is terminated
and the 'successor' partnership is limited to computing its allowance for depreciation
under the 125 percent declining balance method."
48. Dickey Report, supra note 31, at 9-11; Special Study, supra note 32, pt. I,
at 582-83. Part of the Dickey Report is discussed in 8 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRuST J. 439 (1973).
49. See Dickey Report, supra note 31.
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sible changes in the federal tax laws or regulations or interpre-
tations thereunder; the investor's inability to stay in a certain tax
bracket; development or construction cost overruns; operation
losses caused by delayed rent up or subsequent vacancy factors;
financial capabilities of users (particularly in government sub-
sidized housing projects); specialized management problems; rise
in operating expenses; limited partners' inability to participate in
management decisions; partnership for tax purposes ceases under
certain events; transferability limitations; and tax consequences in
the event of foreclosure or other disposition. 50
In addition, the Real Estate Advisory Committee devoted an entire sec-
tion to the conflicts of interest that often inhere in real estate syndica-
tion and which, in part, stem from the many roles which the syndica-
tor or those affiliated with him may assume, such as builder, under-
writer, manager, mortgage broker, insurance agent or lawyer. 5'
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the general policy con-
cern that investors be serviced by qualified sales personnel is height-
ened when the security in question involves a tax shelter. The only
countervailing consideration would be the argument that purchasers
of tax sheltered securities are more sophisticated and thus are better
able to fend for themselves in the transaction; the need for compe-
tency and integrity on the part of the salesman in the transaction is
thereby reduced. With a record that is replete with examples such
as the sale of orange groves to persons retired and living on Social
Security pensions, this argument simply does not hold water.52
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 40-46.
52. American Agronomics Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 5667 (Dec. 11,
1972). With respect to this litigation, former Chairman Casey has stated: "Over em-
phasis on tax factors produces unhappy consequences. With disconcerting frequency
tax sheltered deals in real estate, oil, gas, cattle, [and] citrus fruits are being sold to
widows, retired people, and other persons of modest means who desperately need ordi-
nary income and for whom such adventures are usually unsuitable. That, of course,
is more than a disclosure problem. It is a selling practice problem. The SEC and
the securities industry's own organizations have been trying valiantly for decades to
elevate the ethical standards of those who sell securities and to make their trade the
profession that it ought to be. Without depreciating what has been done along this
line, I find myself constrained to observe that marketing practices in the tax shelter
field reveals how much remains to be done.
The point is much on my mind at the moment. Perhaps that is so because of
one pending case in which tax-sheltered agricultural deals were sold (sold fradulently
and deceptively, we at the Commission think) to substantial numbers of people whose
circumstances were so very modest as to render the concept of tax shelter ludicrous.
Some of these people were actually at the poverty level, although they did happen to
have small amounts of capital that belonged in savings banks not in risky and sophis-
ticated packages originally tailored for persons who could afford to bear losses with
equanimity. Fortunately, it appears that the Commission's efforts will result in some
measure of restitution. Schreiber, supra note 39, at 104.
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Status of Participants in the Distribution
of Tax Sheltered Securities
At the risk of oversimplification, there are essentially three cate-
gories of participants involved in the distribution of tax sheltered se-
curities: (1) The promoter or issuer, its employees, and those affili-
ated with it; (2) Professional securities personnel subject to the self-
discipline of the NASD53 or SECO;54 and (3) Members of the real
estate brokerage community or other professional sales personnel not
regulated within the securities industry. Considerations involved with
the status of the first category will receive the primary emphasis in this
article; however a brief word on the second and third categories is in
order.
53. "NASD" refers to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the
only association of brokers or dealers which has registered with the Commission pur-
suant to the authority of section 15A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). In
order for an association to be allowed to register with the Commission, it is necessary
that: "[tihe rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide safe-
guards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other
charges, and, in general, to protect investors in the public interest, and to remove im-
pediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market . . . ." Section
15A(b) (8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (8) (1970). In addition, it must appear that: "(9)
the rules of the association provide that its members and persons associated with its
members shall be appropriately disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine, censure, or
being suspended or barred from being associated with all members, or any other fitting
penalty, for any violation of its rules. (10) the rules of the association provide a fair
and orderly procedure with respect to the disciplining of members and persons asso-
ciated with members and the denial of membership to any broker or dealer seeking
membership therein or the barring of any person from being associated with a mem-
ber." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(b)(9)-(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9)-
(10) (1970).
54. "SECO" is the abbreviation for Securities and Exchange Commission Only.
In other words, it refers to those brokers or dealers who are not members of the NASD
and who, prior to the 1964 amendments to the 1934 Act, were not subject to self disci-
pline. At present, section 15(b)(8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1970),
provides that a broker or dealer who is not a member of the NASD shall not engage
in the securities business "unless such broker or dealer and all natural persons associ-
ated with such broker or dealer meet such specified and appropriate standards with
respect to training, experience, and such other qualifications as the Commission finds
necessary or desirable."
Section 15(b)(10), 15 U..S.C. § 78o(b)(10) (1970), provides as follows: "No
broker or dealer subject to paragraph (8) of this subsection shall effect any transaction
in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any security (otherwise than on a national se-
curities exchange) in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide
safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other
charges, and in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and to remove im-
pediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market." The Commission
has enacted the appropriate rules and regulations to implement the foregoing sections.
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Self Regulation by the NASD in the Tax Shelter Area
On May 9, 1972, the NASD published for comment an informal
proposal to amend its "Rules of Fair Practice" so as to establish stan-
dards in connection with the distribution of tax shelter securities by
NASD members.55 The proposed rules, which run over fifty pages
in length, cover a broad spectrum. In particular, the proposed rules
would require a minimum amount of experience and expertise by
NASD members who would sponsor a tax sheltered program, a favor-
able tax ruling or opinion of independent counsel as to the tax bene-
fits of the program, a stringent suitability standard, a disclosure man-
date for sales literature, and inhibitions against conflicts of interest.
With respect to suitability, a customer considering a high risk invest-
ment would need to be in a 50 percent tax bracket and would need to
have a sufficient net worth to be able to sustain possibility of loss of
the investment. With respect to sales literature, it would be required
that the literature include a statement of the factors relevant to the
suitability of the security and an accurate statement of the tax aspects
of the program. 6
While these rules have not as yet even been formally proposed so
as to precipitate a position by the Securities and Exchange Commission,7
they indicate a professional view as to the appropriate standards in
connection with the sale of tax sheltered securities. Moreover, the in-
vestor who deals through an NASD member is already protected by
55. In addition to the May 9, 1972 proposed revision which would have the ef-
fect of adding article III, section 33 to the rules of fair practice, there has also been
a September 18, 1972 and a March 19, 1973 revision. The NASD proposals are con-
trasted with the present New York law in HAFr, supra note 9, at App. -55 to -58.
The proposals are also discussed in the Dickey Report, supra note 48, at 24-35. The
Dickey Report, in a series of tables contrasts the NASD proposed rules with those pro-
posed by the Midwest Securities Commission Association and the California Department
of Corporations, as well as with the present New York law.
56. The text of the proposed rules is available at the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Public Reference Room or from the NASD itself, 1735 K Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006. See note 55 supra.
57. Section 15A(j) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970), provides that
every registered securities association shall file any modifications to its rules and that
such rules shall become effective upon the 30th day after filing with the Commission
unless the Commission would enter an order disapproving such change or addition. The
proposed rules referred to in note 55 supra have not as yet been formally proposed,
but it is expected they will be shortly.
One of the concerns with the proposed rules is that they in effect deal with the
merits of the security and thus, by excluding NASD members from participating in
the distribution of securities which do not meet the standards of the rules, embody
a demarcation from the general thrust of the federal securities laws to require disclos-
ure but not to go to the merits of a security.
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the training and supervision requirements of the NASD rules and the
obligation to consider the suitability of the investment for the client.58
The Role of Real Estate Brokers
At present, tax sheltered securities are often sold through the
medium of real estate brokers (or other professional salesmen with-
out a securities background) who are either responsible for consum-
mating the transaction or who act as "finders" in the transaction.5" If
a promoter of tax sheltered securities sells such securities through a
real estate broker, it would seem clear that such individual should be
registered as a broker-dealer under the 1934 Act. 60 Even if his role
is only that of "finder," the commission has generally taken the posi-
tion that, if the finder does anything more than merely introduce the
parties, he also should be registered.6' This conclusion is mandated
not only by the need of the public for control over the character and
competency of the sales representatives with whom it deals, but also
as an insurance that the regulatory scheme operates evenhandedly. In
58. See, e.g., NASD Bylaws, art. I §§ 1, 2 & Schedule C, NASD MANuAL 1101-
02A; NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III § 2, NASD MANUAL 1 2152. See notes 53
& 54 supra.
59. See The Woodmoor Corp., SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter (Feb. 3,
1972), [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,653; San Diego-Maui
Group, SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter (Sept. 7, 1971), [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 78,444.
60. Id.; see Haystack Hotel Assoc. Inc., SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter
Feb. 16, 1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,049. But
see Dart Industries, SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter (Mar. 9, 1972), discussed
in Schwartz, supra note 10, at 439-40. One commentator has stated: "Thus, the
broker/dealer definition net is broad enough to encompass general partners of limited
partnerships who act as such with a reasonable degree of frequency and who offer lim-
ited partnership interest therein to others, and 'real estate brokers' under certain cir-
cumstances." HAFT, supra note 9, § 2.05[l], at 2-22.
With respect to other professional persons, Ezra Weiss has stated that problems
could arise where broker-dealers "circulate invitations to attorneys and accountants,
upon the inducement of a commission, to sell to their clients the securities being of-
fered by such broker-dealers [since] acceptance of these proposals would result in the
accountants and attorneys becoming engaged in the business of effecting transactions
in securities for the account of others, and thereby becoming brokers." WEIss, supra
note 27, § 1-2, at 7.
61. See Fulham & Co., Inc., SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. No-action Letter (Nov. 21, 1972),
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,186; Leonard-Trapp & As-
sociates Consultants, SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. (July 25, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,971; see WEiss supra note 27 § 1-3, at 8: "[I]f
an independent organization, or even an individual who is in fact an independent con-
tractor, should sell securities on behalf of a broker-dealer for a commission, or should
receive forwarding fees for channelling business to the broker-dealer, such organization
or individual would be viewed as engaged in the securities business as a broker."
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other words, the securities broker-dealer community would be com-
petitively disadvantaged if it were subject to constraints that did not
apply to others involved in the distribution of tax sheltered securities.
The argument has been made that, since real estate brokers are
subject to state licensing requirements, they should not also be sub-
ject to federal regulation as broker-dealers.62 Such an argument is not
persuasive. Members of the securities industry are subject to dual
regulation, both state and federal and, while registration might be par-
ticularly onerous for the small real estate broker, it is equally so for the
small securities broker-dealer. Moreover, it is unlikely that a small
real estate broker would be chosen to distribute tax sheltered securi-
ties.
It is assumed, without research, that the quality of real estate li-
censing differs from state to state. In addition, it can hardly be
gainsaid that examination designed to measure the competency to sell
residences is at all relevant or adequate when the product is a tax shel-
tered security. As discussed above, 63 it is particularly important to the
investing public that the purveyors of these securities should have a
special competence with respect to their special characteristics and
should be aware of the concepts of fraud and fiduciary responsibility
which exist in the securities industry and which arguably are a cut
above that which prevails, as a general rule, in the real estate industry.
One can look in vain in the real estate field for anything even com-
parable to the commission and NASD proceedings disciplining se-
curities broker-dealers for unethical selling activities.
64
If the generalized securities examination for broker-dealers is in
part irrelevant for those real estate brokers who limit their activities in
62. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 34-35. See also the Dickey Report, supra
note 48, which recommended: "Licensed real estate brokers and salespersons and/or
those otherwise exempt under local law from licensing as real estate brokers or sales-
persons should be exempt from the broker-dealer reporting and regulatory requirements
under the 1934 Act where their sales of real estate securities are limited to interests
in condominiums and cooperatives." Id. at 75.
63. See text accompanying notes 38-52 supra.
64. See, e.g., NASD MANUAL 701 et seq. In addition, almost any issue of the
Wall Street Journal will note disciplinary action by either the NASD or the Commis-
sion. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Dec. 31, 1973, at 2, col. 2; id., Jan. 24, 1974,
at 30, col. 2. The absence of attendant publicity in the real estate field might indicate
that the character of real estate salesmen exceeds that of securities salesmen. One
can form his own conclusion on this point.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Office of Interstate Land Sales Regis-
tration has found it necessary to adopt new and stronger regulations governing disclos-
ures as a result of public hearings last year which revealed numerous instances of false
and misleading sales activity. See id., at 30, col. 1.
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the securities field to tax shelters, then the solution is to tailor an ap-
propriate examination rather than to eschew regulation. As the Spe-
cial Study stated:
Any licensing program should recognize, to the extent not found
at present the different competence needs of salesmen of differ-
ent types of securities .... It should be possible to establish a
licensing system permitting a person to sell a particular type of se-
curity upon demonstration of his competence to sell it, but at the
same time limiting his activities to that type of security. 65
There is, however, one situation in which real estate brokers
should be permitted to sell tax sheltered securities and that is in con-
nection with isolated sales by the original purchasers. Since there is no
formal aftermarket for tax sheltered securities66 and since no concen-
trated selling effort by a promoter will attend a resale by the original
investor, the regulatory process should not lock him into his invest-
ment by restricting the limited opportunity he will have to dispose of
his investment.
Status of the Issuer, Its Employees and Affiliates
The most troublesome area with respect to registration require-
ments in connection with the sale of tax sheltered securities involves
the status of the issuer and its employees and affiliates. The conven-
tional wisdom is that the issuer need not be registered as a broker-
dealer because of the so-called "issuer's exemption" and that, as a
concomitant to the issuer's exemption, employees need not register
since the issuer, at least if it is organized under the corporate form,
can only act through its agents. Thus, the issuer's exemption would
be meaningless if its employees also were not exempt.
It would appear, however, that in connection with the sale of tax
sheltered securities, logic and policy might indeed dictate that the is-
suer, besides registering the securities it is promoting, should also be
registered as a broker-dealer or that, failing to pursuade on that point,
65. Special Study, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 157. The Special Study also stated:
"[Even a sophisticated investor may have difficulty in evaluating the tax aspects of
an offering, or the factors of risk and promoters' benefits, and the best investment
analysts and counselors have little if any expertise in the real estate securities field.
... There is substantial evidence that many unqualified persons engage in selling real
estate securities. In the discussion of qualifications for entry into the securities busi-
ness the conclusion has already been indicated that salesmen of real estate securities
should be within the licensing requirements there outlined, and that the suggested test-
ing requirements take account of the special attributes of real estate securities." Id.
at 588.
66. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
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as a bare minimum the employees of the issuer should be obliged to
register-as should any subsidiary organized by the issuer for pur-
poses of carrying on the selling activity.
Status of the Issuer-Form
In point of fact, there is no express statutory exemption from
registration as a broker-dealer for the issuer. Rather, the so-called "is-
suer's exemption" proceeds implicitly from an examination of the defi-
nition of broker in section 3(a)(4) and the definition of dealer in
section 3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act. Broker is defined to mean "any
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others,"'6 7 whereas dealer is defined to mean "any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his
own account . . . but does not include . . . any person insofar as he
buys or sells securities for his own account . . . but not as a part of a
regular business."68
Thus, arguably, an issuer is not a broker because it effects trans-
actions in securities for its own account, not for the account of others,
nor is it a dealer because, though it sells securities for its own ac-
count, it does not buy such securities and the act appears to require
that to be a dealer one must both buy and sell. Moreover, most issu-
ers also would be outside the definition of dealer because they do not
sell securities as a part of a regular business.
The foregoing interpretation finds solid support. Ezra Weiss, for-
mer Chief Counsel of the commission, has stated that "[c]ontrasted
with the activity which might render a person a broker acting on behalf
of others, a dealer's activity must include both the buying and selling
of securities."69  Professor Loss has stated that "even if it [an issuer]
is considered to be engaged in the 'business' of selling securities, [it]
does not do any buying as required by the definition. ' 70  In his 1969
supplement, Professor Loss goes even further and states:
By contrast, one of the consequences of the 'buying and selling'
phrase in the definition of 'dealer' is that, in the light of the non-
applicability of the definition of 'security' to entire oil or gas lease-
holds . . . a promoter who buys an entire leasehold (or enters
into a lease himself) and then creates and sells fractional inter-
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(4) (1970).
(emphasis added).
68. Id. § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(5) (emphasis added).
69. WEISS, supra note 27, § 1-1, at 3.
70. 2 L. Loss, SECURMEs REGULATION 1298 (2d ed. 1961), (Supp. 1969) (em-
phasis in original).
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ests is only selling securities, not buying them, and hence need not
register as a dealer.
71
The foregoing comments of Mr. Weiss and Professor Loss relate to the
question of whether the issuer can be a dealer; they do not consider
the question of whether an issuer can be a broker, apparently on the
basis that it is self-evident that the issuer is acting for itself and not
for the account of others.
Status of the Issuer-Substance
With due deference to the statutory definitions and the commen-
tary thereon by Mr. Weiss and Professor Loss, it is nonetheless sub-
mitted that in many instances the conventional wisdom is wanting
when applied to a consideration of the distribution of tax sheltered se-
curities. By way of contrast, the normal corporate issuer is engaged
in business activity to which the sale of its securities is merely ancil-
lary; in other words, it sells its securities to procure the capital base
from which to carry on its business activities. Moreover, the securities
which it sells involve a proprietary (or creditor) interest in itself. On
the other hand, the issuer of a tax sheltered security is often a promo-
ter whose primary business it is to "create" such securities and to dis-
tribute the same to the public. Moreover, the securities sold provide
an equity interest, not in the issuer itself, but in some third party en-
tity.
A few examples may help illustrate the foregoing point. Quite
often, the business of a general partner in a real estate limited partner-
ship consists in large part of finding investment properties and form-
ing limited partnerships to own them.72  The same holds true with re-
spect to the developer of investment condominiums who, on a recur-
ring basis, constructs projects in resort areas and sells the condomini-
ums, together with a rental pooling management contract, to invest-
ors.73  In a slightly different vein, the promoter of cattle breeding or
feeding programs is continually assembling herds of cattle and sell-
ing the same overlaid with a management contract.74  Accordingly,
71. 5 L. Loss, SEcurrTEs REGTULATION 3355 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
72. See, e.g., Boetel & Co., SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. (Aug. 30, 1971), [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 78,343.
73. Properties in Paradise, Inc., SEC Div. Corp. Reg. No-action Letter (July 24,
1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 79,062. See generally
Romney & Rohan, Resort Condominiums: The Housing Industry's Prescription for Re-
laxation, Retirement and Real Estate Investment, 2 CONN. L. Rnv. 50, 57-58 (1969).
74. See, e.g., Stratford of Texas, Inc., SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. (Oct. 6, 1972),
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not only is a principal business of the issuer that of selling securities,
but also the securities sold carry with them no proprietary interest in
the issuer itself but rather in the third party entity which the issuer
has created. In other words, the security in question is the product of
the issuer rather than a proprietary interest in the issuer."5
The question then arises as to where this line of reasoning would
take us. If the definition of "dealer" were "any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for his own account"
(the approach taken in the Uniform Securities Act) , 6 it would seem
quite clear that the typical promoter-issuer of tax sheltered securities
would fall within the ambit of this definition. Unfortunately, this is
not the definition used in the 1934 Act. Thus, if we are to require
registration of such an issuer as a broker or dealer, we must either (1)
find such activity as would constitute the buying of a security so as
to make him a dealer or (2) find another entity in the transaction
such that it can be said that the promoter-issuer is acting for the
account of such other entity.
The Issuer As a Dealer
As previously stated, the difficulty with suggesting that the issuer
may also be a dealer is the fact that the statutory definition of dealer
in the 1934 Act speaks of one who both buys and sells securities.
While the promoter-issuer in the tax sheltered area will be selling se-
curities, difficulty arises with the question of whether or not he "buys"
securities.
Notwithstanding Professor Loss' example in which he suggests that
the purchase of an entire lease-hold which is then fractionated does
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,099. See also Oppenheimer
Industries, Inc., SEC Reg. No. 2-47486, at 18-21.
75. In the Dickey Report, it was stated that it was not necessary for the prospec-
tive investor that the financial statements of the developer and/or promoter be audited
since "the purchaser is not acquiring an interest in the developer and/or promoter, but,
on the contrary, is acquiring the product itself." Dickey Report, supra note 48, at
86.
76. Section 401 (c) of the Uniform Securities Act defines a broker-dealer to mean
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the ac-
count of others or for his own account." The definition goes on, however, to exempt
an issuer. The draftsmen's commentary to section 401(c) recognizes that many states
require an issuer selling its securities without the intervention of the broker-dealer to
register as a broker-dealer itself. However, since the security must be registered and
since an employee of the issuer who sells securities for the issuer must be registered
as an agent under section 401(b), it was thought to be unnecessary to require also
that the issuer register as a broker-dealer. See L. Loss & E. Cowar'r, BLUE SKY LAW
332-36 (1958).
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not constitute the "buying' of a security,77 the definition of "buy"
in section 3(a)(13) of the 1934 Act, which includes any contract to
buy, purchase, or "otherwise acquire" a security, 78 could be interpre-
ted to encompass the creation of a security. Thus, when a promoter-
issuer constructs a condominium and affixes a rental pooling ar-
rangement to it, or purchases a herd of cattle and affixes a manage-
ment contract to it, it is arguable that such "manufacturing" of a se-
curity is a form of "otherwise acquiring" a security within the defini-
tion of "buy" in the act. It is obvious that such a method of produc-
ing a security differs significantly from the activity of the normal cor-
porate issuer in selling additional proprietary interests in itself.
Support for this approach can be found from the position of the
commission, with respect to investment contracts, that the security en-
compasses both the contract and the underlying subject matter.79
Since the promoter-issuer very often purchases the underlying asset in
connection with the tax sheltered security (the real estate for the con-
dominium or the cattle for a feeder or breeder program), and since
the component parts of the security are indivisible, it would also seem
arguable that such purchase would satisfy the requirement in the defi-
nition of dealer that the dealer be engaged in both the buying and sell-
ing of securities. Again, this situation is in sharp contrast with that of
the conventional issuer, for example, a corporation issuing its stock,
in which the corporation need acquire nothing (save for a charter
from the appropriate governmental body) in order to "issue" its securi-
ities. This fundamental difference in the way in which the "issuer"
comes into possession of the securities which it would issue would
justify treating the promoter-issuer as a dealer.
The Issuer As a Broker
The difficulty in suggesting that an issuer may be a broker is that,
presumptively, the issuer is effecting transactions in securities for its
own account and not for the account of another. While this certainly
77. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (13) (1970).
79. In footnote 1 to SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347, January 4, 1973,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP'. 79,163, the Commission reiter
ated that "where an investment contract is present, it consists of the agreement offered
and the condominium itself." It appears that the Federal Reserve Board is about to
adopt the Commission's position in proposed amendment (1) to § 220.6 of Regulation
T. Credit by Brokers and Dealers, 12 C.F.R. § 220.6 (1973). It states that for the pur-
pose of financing an investment contract security such as a cattle feed program or in-
vestment condominium, credit arranged on. any part would be deemed to be credit ar-
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holds true with respect to the conventional corporate issuer, in many
instances the issuance of a tax sheltered security involves several legal
entities with the resultant possibility that the promoter-issuer may
in fact be effecting transactions in securities for others as well as for
itself. For example, in the investment condominium area, it will be
necessary to incorporate a nonprofit corporation to administer the com-
mon areas and the detail involved in condominium ownership of prop-
erty.80 Moreover, once a rental pooling arrangement is entered into, in
effect the owners of the individual condominium units will have formed
a partnership to operate the leasing of their units.8 ' Thus, the action
of the promoter-issuer in arranging for membership in the nonprofit
condominium association, or in putting together a partnership (in
which it does not participate) for the purpose of pooling rentals, obvi-
ously involves the promoter-issuer in effecting transactions for the ac-
count of others.
In a similar vein, the promoter-issuer of cattle breeding and feed-
ing arrangements often is entitled, pursuant to the management agree-
ment, to exchange the investor's cattle for other cattle, or to pool the
investor's cattle with cattle of other investors to take advantage of lower
costs or better care, or to arrange for loans against the cattle or possibly
even to draw upon an account set up by the investor for the expenses of
maintaining the herd or to augment the herd.8 2  Thus, while the initial
sale of the herd to the investor may have been solely a transaction for the
account of the promoter-issuer, thereafter it engages in much activity for
the account of the investor and such activity may well bring it within
the definition of a broker.
With respect to limited partnerships, in reality the limited partner-
ship is the entity which is issuing the security and the promoter-issuer,
who acts as general partner, is thereby effecting a transaction for the
account of a limited partnership when it solicits investors to become
limited partners. While the argument can be made that the limited
ranged on the entire security and therefore subject to Regulation T. Proposed With-
drawal of Permission to Sell Certain Investments on Credit, [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,423 (FAS 1973). This position could have a devastating effect
on the financing of tax sheltered securities. See HAFT, supra note 9, at § 2.05[2].
80. See generally Hennessey, Practical Problems of Residential Condominium
Operation, 2 CONN. L. REv. 12 (1969).
81. To this author, it is unquestioned that participation in a "rental pool" could
constitute the participants as anything other than partners since there is an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit, the classical
definition set forth in section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act. See Dickey Report,
supra note 48, at 76-81.
82. See Oppenhiemer Registration Statement, SEC Reg. No. 2-47486, at 39-42.
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partnership can only act through its agents, of which the general part-
ner is one,83 nonetheless an agent who, as a regular part of its busi-
ness, is continually putting together a series of limited partnerships is
certainly engaged in the business of effecting transactions for the ac-
count of others. To hold otherwise would be to be blind to the real-
ities of the situation.14
The Status of Employees of the Issuer
Prescinding from the status of the issuer, let us consider what
ought to be the status of employees of the issuer when they engage
in the distribution of tax sheltered securities. While such employees
most likely will not be in the business of "buying and selling" securities
such as to constitute themselves dealers, they most certainly effect
"transactions in securities for the account of others." Thus, in order
to make a judgment as to whether their activity mandates registration
as a broker-dealer, the critical element will be whether they are also
"engaged in the business" of effecting such transactions within the
meaning of such section 3 (a) (4) of the 1934 Act.
The General View
Much of the "authority" which has thus far considered the ques-
tion evidences a reluctance to treat employees of the issuer as "engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
83. This is the argument that was made in Choice Communities, Inc., SEC Div.
Mkt. Reg. No-action Letter (Nov. 29, 1972) [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 79,203, and which was apparently accepted by the Commission.
84. As Mr. Haft had stated, "the broker/dealer definition net is broad enough
to encompass general partners of limited partnerships who act as such with a reason-
able degree of frequency and who offer limited partnership interests therein to others
. H" -TA, supra note 9, § 2.05[1], at 2-22. See also Hofheimer, Gartlir, Gottlieb
& Gross, SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. No-action Letter (Oct. 12, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 79,098 (investor who regularly invested in limited
partnership interests and on various occasions assigned some of the same was denied
a no-action letter to the effect that he need not register as a broker-dealer).
In addition, Mr. Weiss has stated: "What has been stated with reference to a
director or officer of a corporation applies equally to general partners of a limited part-
nership who effect or participate in the public offering of interests by the limited
partnership." WEIss, supra note 27, § 1-2, at 5. While the tests that Weiss suggests
with respect to an officer or director would generally not require that the officer or
director register as a broker-dealer, the same tests, when applied to a general partner,
could well require his registration as a broker-dealer. For example, the general part-
ner often does receive special compensation for selling the securities (this is one of
the factors that give rise to conflict of interest problems in this area, see Dickey Re-
port, supra note 48, at 40-46) and the general partner very often assumes sole or
primary responsibility for the distribution. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
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others" so as to require their registration as a broker-dealer. Profes-
sor Loss, in summarily discussing the problem, applies the simplistic
test of whether or not the individual in question is a "servant" or
"independent contractor" at the common law.85 Along the same line,
former Commissioner Gadsby, in his treatise, after stating that an is-
suer need not register as a dealer because it does not buy its own
stock, states with respect to employees:
Similarly, the Act does not apply to an officer of a corporation
who is selling stock in a company, certainly if he gets no special
compensation for the activity. Even if he does get a commission
on sales, he is probably exempt if such activities are part of his
employment.8 6
On the other hand, Mr. Weiss accepts the possibility that an em-
ployee may need to be registered:
The more troublesome problems are posed, however, by the is-
suer's directors, officers, and employees who receive special com-
pensation for soliciting subscriptions for the securities. It may be
that any such person is an underwriter as defined in Section 2(11)
of the Securities Act. Nevertheless, he would not be a "broker" if
he is under the issuer's supervision and control, he devotes his full
time in rendering services for the issuer and he neither was pre-
viously engaged in the sale of securities, nor proposes to do so
following the completion of the offering . . . . If a director or
officer of an issuer has an arrangement that he is to assume the
responsibility for sale of the entire issue in return for a commission
on sales, and if the selling expenses, including the compensation of
salesmen, are to be borne by him, he is manifestly in business as
a "broker." Purchase by an officer or director of the securities
from the issuer as principal, for resale to the public, would result
in his being "engaged in the business" and thus being a "dealer."'t
Along the same lines, Mr. Raymond R. Dickey, one of the most knowl-
edgable practitioners in this area,8 has recognized that whether a per-
son is a bona fide employee of the issuer is a question to be deter-
mined on a case by case basis and has suggested the following criteria
for consideration:
(1) Whether the issuer pays Social Security taxes and Unemploy-
ment Compensation premiums with respect to the "em-
ployee";
(2) Whether the employee receives a salary from the issuer
or is compensated on a commission basis;
85. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1298 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
86. E. GADSBY, 1lA BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION, FEDERAL
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, § 3.0211] at 3-4 to -5 (1968).
87. WEISS, supra note 27, § 1.2, at 4-5.
88. Mr. Dickey was Chairman of the Advisory Committee whose report is cited
in note 48 supra.
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(3) Whether the employee has been associated with the issuer
for some time prior to the offering;
(4) Whether he intends to remain in the employ of the issuer
following the completion of the offering;
(5) Whether the employee performs other duties for the issuer
in addition to the sales of securities; and
(6) The business background of the employee.8 9
Until recently, the commission itself appeared willing to issue a no-ac-
tion letter that registration of the employees would not be required if
the employees were bona fide employees who would continue in the
employ of the issuer, particularly if they had other duties than selling
tax sheltered securities and if they were not compensated wholly on a
commission basis. 90
The Reality
It would be difficult to quarrel with Mr. Weiss' position that cor-
porate treasurers "who purchase stock in the market for company em-
ployees pursuant to stock purchase plans," but who enter into no other
securities transaction, ought not to bear the burden of being registered
as broker-dealers.91 This would be a classic example of incidental
activity by a corporate employee who has substantial other duties and
engages in the securities transactions only as an incident to such other
duties.
On the other hand, an entirely different situation is presented when
the issuer in question is engaged in the business of "producing" secur-
ities on a regular basis and marketing such securities through its em-
ployees. In such a situation, the status of the employee more nearly
approaches that of an employee of an investment banker as contrasted
to the status of an employee of an employer engaged in a commercial
business other than the distribution of securities. Quite obviously, em-
ployees of an investment banker are not shielded from registration as
registered representatives by virtue of the fact that they are bona fide
employees. The question is not whether they are employees but rather
whether 'they are regularly engaged in the business of selling securities
for the account of others.
92
Recent no-action letters from the commission indicate a change in
89. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 437.
90. See, e.g., Landcom, Inc., SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter (May 7,
1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH MED. SEc. L. REP. f 78,176. See also
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 439-40.
91. WEiss, supra note 27, § 1-2, at 6.
92. HAFT, supra note 9, at'§ 2.05[1].
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attitude and emphasis. 93  It appears that the commission is now focus-
ing not so much on the regularity of employment but rather the
regularity of the selling activity in connection with tax sheltered securi-
ties. This is as it should be. Moreover, the fact that an employee
may also perform substantial other duties for the employer is not in-
consistent with his obligation to register as a broker-dealer. As Mr.
Weiss has stated:
It may be observed that there is nothing in the definitions
of broker and dealer which would warrant a conclusion that a
person cannot be engaged in the business in respect of securities
merely because such business is only a minor part of the person's
activities or merely because the income from it represents only a
small fraction of his total income. On the contrary, if the activity
is engaged in for commissions or other compensation with suffi-
cient recurrence to justify the inference that the activity is part
of the person's business, he will be deemed to be "engaged in the
business" within the meaning of that term as used in the defini-
tions of broker and dealer.
94
Whether the employee has prior experience in the securities indus-
try should also be an immaterial factor, notwithstanding the view of
some commentators and language in some no-action letters intimat-
ing that such lack of experience was one of the factors justifying the
issuance of the letter.95 If it were otherwise, the issuer could avoid
the registration of its employees by hiring those with the weakest cre-
dentials, namely, those who have no prior experience in connection
with the sale of securities. It hardly seems that the public policy of
protecting the public from incompetent salesmen is served by a policy
which would encourage the hiring of the least competent people.
In summary, the fact that a promoter-issuer which is in the busi-
ness of effecting transactions in securities for its own account might
be outside the registration requirements for a dealer because of a lit-
eral reading of the definition of dealer should not have the effect of
extending the umbrella of exemption to employees of such issuer who
are regularly engaged in selling tax sheltered securities. Common law
niceties, such as the distinction between independent contractor and
employee, should not be permitted to thwart one of the purposes of
93. See, e.g., Wainoco Oil Ltd., SEC Div. Mkt. Reg. No-action Letter (July 18,
1973), dealing with the sale of limited partnerships for the fourth consecutive year,
in which the Commission issued a no-action letter conditioned upon the organization
of a subsidiary which would register as a broker-dealer and the officers of which would
become qualified as registered representatives.
94. WEiss, supra note 27, § 1-3, at 7-8.
95. See, e.g., Landcom, Inc., SEC Div. Tr. & Mkt. No-action Letter (May 7,
1971), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 78,176.
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the 1934 Act, namely, to insure that the investing public is serviced
by sales personnel who are trained and competent and whose charac-
ter is "supported" by the discipline of self-regulation.
Conclusion
The public interest in requiring registration of those engaged in
the selling effort in connection with the distribution of tax sheltered se-
curities cannot be gainsaid. Not only is the public entitled to expect
that the regulatory process will impact upon those dealing with the
public so as to insure, to the extent possible, their competence and
character but also the regulated part of the securities industry which
also engages in the sale of tax sheltered securities is entitled to expect
that regulation will bear equally upon all those engaged in the distribu-
tion of such securities.
On the other hand, it is also quite clear that many of the reporting
and financial obligations of a broker-dealer would be particularly oner-
ous to a promoter-issuer engaged in the tax sheltered security business.
This is particularly true for a company engaged in developing real
estate since it would be impossible for such a company to comply
with the net capital requirements applicable to broker-dealers. 96 How-
ever, these problems could be surmounted by the promoter-issuer or-
ganizing a subsidiary to carry on the selling effort. Thus, it would be
the subsidiary which would be registered as a broker-dealer, the em-
ployees of which would be registered representatives. While this
might produce the anomolous result that the customer will have, from
a financial standpoint, a less substantial entity responsible to him, it
could be that section 20 of the 1934 Act, imposing liability upon con-
trolling persons, to wit, the parent corporation, would obviate this con-
cern. Otherwise, recourse against the promoter-issuer could be assured
by requiring it to undertake financial responsibility for the selling prac-
tices of its subsidiary along the lines of the approach in Rule 15c 3-1
96. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(1973). Section (c)(2)(ii) of the Rule defines net capital to exclude certain assets
including fixed assets and assets which cannot be readily convertible into cash such
as real estate. As to the policy considerations underlying the net capital rule, see No-
tice of Proposal to Amend Rule 15c3-1 under the Exchange Act, SEC Securities Act
Release No. 9891, Dec. 5, 1972, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,128.
In addition, the reporting requirements stemming from being registered as a
broker-dealer could be quite onerous. See, e.g., SEC Advisory Committee Study on
Broker-Dealer Reports and Registration Requirements, Dec. 15, 1972, [1972-1973 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. f 79,147.
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(b) (1) which conditions exemption from net capital on such an
undertaking.
9 7
Thus, if the commission were to take a fresh look at the selling
practices in the tax sheltered security industry, it should be possible
to create a structure which would assure protection to the investing
public, even-handed regulatory treatment of all those who participate in
the distribution of tax sheltered securities and reasonable restraints
and requirements of that part of the industry which is not now regu-
lated.
97. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (b)(1)
(1973).
